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Structures for Transmission Investment
First proposal: independent system operator retains some transmission rights in an LTFTR auction Second proposal: "Transco" that is regulated through benchmark or price regulation to provide it with incentives to invest in the development of the grid, while avoiding congestion.
Third proposal: derive optimal transmission expansion from the power-market structure of electricity generation 4
Structures for Transmission Investment LTFTR APPROACH
Based on a centralized ISO that allocates FTRs through an auction and in parallel with LT generation contracts LTFTR "merchant" alternative can provide market-based transmission pricing that attracts investors to pay for transmission expansion
In order to proceed with a line expansion, the investor pays for the negative externalities generated.
To restore feasibility, an ISO would have to retain some transmission rights in an auction for long-term rights to make sure that the expansion project does not violate the property rights of the original transmission right holders. 
Structures for Transmission Investment
Defining proxy awards is a difficult task: the best use of the current grid along the same direction of the (positive or negative) incremental FTRs Two possibilities: one is to define "best" in terms of preset proxy references so that proxy awards maximize the value of such references:
Another possibility would be to define "best" in terms of the maximum value of investors' preferences. Proxy awards would then minimize such maximum value:
An auction carried out to attract investment for transmission expansion so that value of investment is maximized in direction δ subject to the simultaneously feasibility conditions and the "best" rule. 
MARKET POWER HYPOTHESIS
How to design a mechanism that defines optimal transmission expansion depending on market-power structure of the generation sector? Sheffrin and Wolak (2001) derive optimal expansion of the transmission network according to strategic behavior of generators, and estimate the generators' bidding behavior before and after a transmission upgrade London Economics International (2002) discusses a conjectural model where each generator maximizes profits in its residual demand function, and given the predicted other bidder's supply functions. Results show that benefits of transmission expansion are small until added capacity surpasses a certain threshold that, in turn, is determined by the possibility of induced congestion by strategic behavior of generators with market power. Cost uncertainty implies that many small upgrades are preferable to large greenfield projects. However, this approach relies on a transportation model
Structures for Transmission Investment
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FINANCIAL TRANSMISSION RIGHTS
Hedge market players against differences in locational prices caused by transmission congestion The pay-off is given by: FTR = Q ij (P j -P i ) where P j is the price of location j, P i is the price of location i and Q ij is the directed quantity specified in the FTR from point i to point j
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The Power Flow Model
REVENUE ADEQUACY
The revenue collected by the ISO with locational prices should at least equal the payments to the FTR holders Simultaneous feasibility implies revenue adequacy: ( , ) 0,
The Auction Model The Auction Model 
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